Hannah Arendt is one of the few philosophers to examine the dynamics of political action at length. Intriguingly, she emphasises the disclosure of who the actor is as a specific distinction of political action. This emphasis is connected with some longstanding worries about Arendt's account that centre on its apparent unconcern for political responsibility. In this paper I argue that Arendt's emphasis on disclosure actually harbours a profound concern with responsibility. I do so by examining three questions. The main part of the paper focuses on how disclosure is bound up with political actors' attempts to act with one another. It asks: what would it be for an actor to evade disclosure? And: what is involved in an actor acknowledging the fact of disclosure? -Looking at the matter negatively, attempts to evade disclosure and its implications lead to irresponsibility. Positively, for the actor to accept disclosure is to see herself as bound to her fellow actors and audience by relations of joint action and mutual accountability. The conclusion asks a third question: what would it mean for onlookers to deny the relevance of actors' disclosure? I argue that Arendt's historiography -which revolves around stories in which political actors reveal who they are -reflects her conviction that people can and must take responsibility for their world.
political actor to refuse disclosure of her identity, or to try and make this disclosure irrelevant? The central thought I pursue is this: When someone attempts to evade disclosure or its implications, this inevitably has the effect of denying shared responsibility for political affairs, and thus leads to characteristic forms of irresponsibility. I then pose a second question: What is involved in the actor's acknowledging and accepting the fact of disclosure? I suggest such acknowledgement lends us important clues about the spirit and principles of responsible political action.
An actor who is prepared to appear before others relies on their judgments and hopes for their support, thus upholding the principle of shared responsibility for the world. I conclude by posing a third question: What would it mean, to deny that it matters that actors disclose themselves in the course of action? As part of her emphasis on disclosure, Arendt tells us that the 'most original' product of action is not the realisation of a particular goal or end, but rather a story. This may suggest an undue concern with the viewpoint and satisfactions of historical spectators. I offer an alternative way of looking at this claim, in order to underline the basic connection between disclosure and responsibility in Arendt's thought.
The process of disclosure and attempts to evade its 'unreckonability'
Arendt claims that the disclosure of actors necessarily occurs in the process of action.
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A person does not have or disclose a unique identity because he embodies some peculiar, non-repeated assemblage of qualities that we might simply enumerate. In Arendt's terms, that would be to mistake the 'what' for the 'who. ' 11 Nor does such a unique identity exist within the self, already there awaiting disclosure: in our inner lives,
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Arendt sees multiplicity rather than identity -in Dana Villa's words, 'a self whose lack of appearance deprives it of both unity and reality.' 12 Rather, a person has a unique identity because he is born into 13 the human web of relationships in a unique place, and then charts -and suffers -a unique course through it, precisely by relating to others who relate to him in their turn. That is, a person's identity is partly constituted by those relations and the (inter)actions by which he stakes his place in the world: 'If there were no shared world [Mitwelt]… the person would be lacking.' 14 Whether we think of private or public life, to say who someone is requires us to tell the story of his interactions and relations with others. And political action is always a matter of interaction: the meeting and crossing of different opinions and initiatives that precisely concern a 'shared world.' 15 Arendt also emphasises that the concomitant disclosure of identities often makes action immensely frustrating: 'the disclosure of the person inheres in all, even the most goaloriented, actions and has for the course of action decisive consequences that are predetermined neither by motives nor by goals.' 16 The frustration arises because we do not know whom others will perceive when we act. While some reactions may be more or less predictable, or quickly emerge in the course of action, no actor can ever be sure what others have made or will make of her. Hence this process of on-going, mutual disclosure introduces an equivocal and unreckonable element into action. Insofar as we can truly say who someone is, this is by telling a story once the person's life is complete 17 : a thread that is already fully woven into the web of human relationships, one that has uniquely affected every other life-thread that it has touched.
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Despite these frustrations, Arendt insists: 'Without the disclosure of the agent in the act, action loses its specific character… It is then indeed no less a means to an end than making is a means to produce an object.' 19 She also suggests that some political actors welcome the disclosure of an identity that they themselves will never know -no reader can ignore her discussion of the ancient Greek understanding of action, with its 'urge toward self-disclosure at the expense of all other factors.' 20 For the most part, however, she admits that the disclosure of identities seems 'of secondary importance,' since action generally concerns 'a demonstrable and worldly given.' 21 Above all, she underlines how the unpredictable consequences of an unknowable disclosure frustrate Disclosure and Responsibility in The Human Condition 5 the actor who wishes to achieve a particular goal or, perhaps, control the identity that others attribute to him.
As a first step in demonstrating how disclosure is related to responsibility, I want to consider the forms of irresponsibility that emerge when actors try to evade this frustration. In the remainder of this section, I will consider how action goes awry when actors try to control this disclosure. In the next section, I consider attempts to prevent its having unpredictable consequences.
Arendt is clear that 'no purpose in the world can have this identity freely at its disposal,' 22 that 'no human being can "shape" his life or create his life-story.' 23 In The Human Condition, she mentions one way in which actors may try to escape this fact.
Elsewhere, she considers two, rather more revealing ways: the attempt to convince the world of an image of oneself, and the attempt to live out a story already lived. After the French example, they knew that the revolution must end by eating its children, and played out their roles accordingly. Their folly was to act as 'good revolutionaries' by reenacting a known history: 'It was the course of events, not the men of the [French] Revolution, which they imitated.' 29 Our identities are indeed revealed in stories; but to encourage events to conform to some previous story is worlds away from the spirit of the original. It is bound to make for a new story -perhaps 'farce' rather than 'tragedy' in Marx's famous words 30 -and disclose quite different persons. Its irresponsibility is also clear: one no longer responds to persons and situations actually encountered, but instead to a preconceived narrative.
The attempt to evade the consequences of disclosure by denying relatedness
Arendt stresses the predicament of the actor who does not know who she discloses and
hence cannot know what her audience will or should make of her. Let me turn, now, to another sort of irresponsible response to this frustration: not the endeavour to control Disclosure and Responsibility in The Human Condition 7 the identity we disclose, but rather the attempt to prevent this disclosure having consequences of its own. In doing this, Arendt contends that we will inevitably be led to substitute making for acting. That is, we fall into an irresponsible attempt to realise a preconceived end-product or state of affairs -to which the opposite is not pure performance or mere disclosure (as some critics, such as those I cited in my introduction, have worried), but rather acting with others in order to uphold or alter the terms on which we live together. 31 The basic reason for this stems from the fact that, in politics, we can only act in relation to others. Action is always a matter of relating, relating always involves appearing, and appearing is disclosing -no matter how concrete our intentions and goals. As Arendt also comments, this separation was 'the result of a responsibility that no man can bear for his fellow-man and no people for another people.' 34 In other words, the refusal of relatedness and disclosure was bound up with the attempt to determine others'
fate from outside and on high. Cowed by force and debarred from all access to their rulers, the 'subject peoples' were denied any responsibility for their world.
Obviously this is an extreme and historically specific example. A more limited and pretty much ubiquitous form consists in attempts to 'pull the strings' from 'behind the scenes' that politics has known since time immemorial. 35 However well-intentioned and even indispensable such measures may occasionally be, the dangers of such refusals to 'show one's hand' -in Arendt's terms, to appear and disclose oneself -are so familiar as to hardly need stating: mutual suspicion, incomprehension, and unaccountability.
Matters are not much better for the actor, since she puts herself at risk of exposure and a concomitant loss of credibility and personal authority -hence the idea of 'plausible deniability,' so useful to those who would exercise powers without taking responsibility for their use.
In Vita Activa, Arendt writes that the political actor who seeks to make an end-product will try to ensure that he and his followers 'are no longer related in any moment of action.' 36 He tries to change the world without relying on human relationships, because these would inevitably act back on and disrupt whatever end he had originally and-stick approach.' 37 If bribery and manipulation imply some bare minimum of relations, then violence stands out as the paradigm mode of action that eschews disclosure. 38 Apart from all moral reservations, irresponsibility arises here in the form of a systematic mistake about the enterprise one is engaged in. The attempt to overcome the frustrations of relating and disclosing by making relationships irrelevant can never fully succeed.
This is because the effective wielding of violence still relies on joint action in the form of a power base -usually, as Arendt reminds us in 'On Violence,' an army or police force. 39 Hence Arendt's repeated insistence that those who make rulership possible do not merely obey, they support. They empower the ruler and effectively act with her;
ruler and supporters remain very much 'related in action.' Inevitably, then, the actor never fully evades the frustrations that arise from the fact that others have their own wills and opinions, which are affected by their responses to her, that is, to the identity she discloses in a way that necessarily exceeds her grasp. Nonetheless, by organised violence and domination it is possible to limit action to an ever-smaller group and render others more or less powerless. This is the irresponsibility of depriving those persons of possible responsibility for their fates and, by the same token, rejecting any accountability to them. In other words, it is a denial that politics involves taking shared responsibility for the world.
Disclosure as a clue to the nature of responsible action
I have pointed to some ways in which political actors might seek to evade the frustrations bound up with self-disclosure -either by attempting to project a preconceived identity, or by attempting to change the world while remaining unrelated to others. In both cases, this is bound up with forms of irresponsibility. The actor who is determined to preserve an image or live out a story has put self before world; the tyrant or imperialist attempts to impose a fate upon others and refuses any responsibility to them, just as the manipulator does on a much smaller scale.
What I would like to consider, now, is how the fact that relating always involves disclosing can provide us with some positive clues to the nature of political responsibility. It will not tell us much about the goals that responsible political actors Disclosure and Responsibility in The Human Condition 10 should pursue. Except at the broadest level -for example, in her concern for lasting institutions that grant people civic status and 'house' political action 40 -Arendt regards these as a matter for political debate and not for philosophical legislation. Indeed, she treats philosophical prescriptions as positively dangerous, insofar as they tend to float free from the questions of practical judgment that face political actors who -whatever their opinions as to how the world should be -must act within a pre-existing and no doubt 'non-ideal' constellation. 41 In other words, Arendt's perspective -unlike that of more prescriptive political theorists -is bound to the problems of assuming responsibility for the world, here and now. 42 To assume such responsibility does not, of course, mean accepting the world as it is; but it does mean accepting that it is this world that must be altered or conserved, and so here one must start. As Arendt puts it, every generation, by virtue of being born into a historical continuum, is burdened by the sins of the fathers as it is blessed with the deeds of the ancestors. Whoever takes upon himself political responsibility will always come to the point where he says with
Hamlet: "The time is out of joint: O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!" 43 My contention is that Arendt's concern with the position of those actors -and in particular, the fact that they disclose themselves in acting with others -can help us appreciate how 'responsibility for the world… arises out of action.' 44 Put simply, to acknowledge the fact of disclosure is to "stand up and be counted": without abandoning the attempt to change others' minds, to prevail over other opinions, and to change the world, the actor remains bound to his audience and fellow actors -and hence to the world that they share, preserve and change through their interaction. 45 Let me begin with the following note from Arendt's Denktagebuch:
Every actor wishes that people will follow him. The deed is always also an example.
Political thought and judgment is exemplary (Kant), because acting is. Responsibility means, in its essence: to know that one sets an example, that others will "follow"; in this way one changes the world.
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There is a familiar refrain in the Arendt literature, largely based on her Kant lectures, that exemplars are crucial to the judgment of the political and historical spectator (just as they were to Arendt's writings). 47 One thing already interesting about this note is its concern with the judgment of the actor: the political actor is asked to appreciate that she 'sets an example.' 48 Moreover, this is the essence of responsibility.
But what might it mean to 'know one sets an example,' that others might "follow"? As should we make of a political actor who were not concerned with how she appears to others?
In the first place, Arendt highlights a self-reflective dimension to the responsible actor's concern for appearances. In her notebooks, she points to the moral and political importance of imagining how one's deed will appear: Don't do unto others what you don't want to be done to yourself. It is an appeal to the imagination: Imagine before doing to others that your doing would be done by others to yourself. Id est: Objectify -look at it from the outside with reference to you. / One could also say, perhaps with greater justification: Before doing imagine how it will look to you after you've done it.
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Or recall the maxim that Arendt approvingly attributes to Machiavelli, "Appear as you may wish to be." 50 This refers the actor both to others' possible perceptions and to actual examples of conduct: 'When I make such a decision [as in "Appear as you wish to be"]… I am making an act of deliberate choice among the various potentialities of conduct with which the world has presented me.' 51 Our imagination takes its bearings both from others' perspectives and from previous examples that we wish to emulate or excel in some way.
52
Second, and less subjectively: An actor who were unconcerned with her appearance before others would show an unjustified confidence in herself, and by implication a Condition, 54 I believe they express one of the anchor-points of all her thinking about action and appearance. Without giving up the intention to act on one's own account, we must trust others' ability to judge whether our example counts as good company 55 or a cautionary tale, and to decide whether they will act in concert with us, whether they will "follow" or not. As Leslie Paul Thiele has argued, this means that Arendtian action has the character of an invitation. 56 To put the point rather paradoxically, in conditions of non-domination, a stance of trust and solicitation is forced upon every actor, at least to some degree. However much she may try to evade this, by cunning or even ruthlessness in the games of power, each actor remains dependent on others' more or less willing cooperation. To take account of their actual and imagined judgments is to accept the basic conditions of action in concert, and of shared responsibility for political affairs.
This leads to a third point. Willing appearance before others and concern for their judgments are elementary conditions of responsibility. They bind together the forwardlooking sense involved in acting so as to take responsibility for the world with the backward-looking sense of accepting that one will be judged responsible for one's deeds. On the one hand, the actor steps into the public realm in order to take a stand on matters that can only be addressed with others and that are relevant to many others. On the other, a person can only answer for her deeds to the extent that her conduct is not hidden but seen by others, and is acknowledged as owing to her own initiative, rather than mere submission to authority or inevitability. To 'know that one sets an example' does not, then, require one to know what example one sets, though it surely demands imagination and judgment of prior examples. Rather, it demands recognition that one will indeed be judged by others, as an actor in one's own right. By virtue of not knowing whom one discloses, the actor is beholden to others -who, seeing the world from their distinct perspectives, may act and respond on their own accounts. As Steve Buckler puts it, 'it is in the nature of that very desire [for public approbation or glory], that… people must acknowledge and subject themselves to the judgment of a community of spectators [who may also be actors], of which they too are members.' 58 Subjectively, there may be a great deal of immodesty in the pursuit of political power and reputation. Objectively, like all ventures that depend on an audience's consent, it involves a counter-intuitive humility and on-going accountability.
Conclusion: telling stories about action
Arendt places the revelatory potential of human action and relationships at the centre of to act in the acknowledgement that a story may be told of one -and judged by others.
Arendt's emphasis on disclosure in political action corresponds to the special urgency that this imperative holds in the public realm -where we no longer move in relatively In the first place, Arendt certainly does not deny that those processes are real and must be understood and acknowledged: their terrifying force is a theme of The Human
Condition as much as Origins of Totalitarianism. More than this, however, I think we should understand her approach as a call to responsibility. Arendt's fundamental conviction is that unless people act together -above all, to found, augment and renew lasting political institutions -human power ceases to reach into the future, so that people are left helpless in the face of social and economic processes and whatever political movements may gain sway by merely cleaving to them. Whether political actors aim to conserve or change their situation, they always inherit a starting point which is the condition of all they do and which they can deny only at the cost of wishful
thinking -yet another form of irresponsibility. 68 In these conditions, no political actor ever achieves exactly what she sets out to achieve, nor does any group, however politics has a moral claim to the first rank of those activities, because it is here that people deliberately attempt to take responsibility for how things go in a world of shared institutions and entwined fates -a prerogative that indeed separates human beings 'from the rest of nature.' 73 Hence stories of how they do this have a unique importance. In a few glorious cases we may recall stories of action in the hope of repeating the actors' OR57f: in part thanks to Marx, 'so much more interested in history than in politics,' they had learned 'history and not action' (OR61, 58). At a personal level, this was also the lesson Isak
